1. A policy prohibiting all "abortion related" speech in Holmes Park.
2. A policy prohibiting all speech "opposing legal abortion" in Holmes park.
3. A policy prohibiting all loud speech above certain decibels in Holmes park.
How does the test for speech in a traditional public forum (see p.1462) apply in each of these cases?
Here is the Court's test:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
The quote is from Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted) (bold emphasis added).
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