Wednesday, March 31, 2021

Tinker and the Schoolhouse Gate (p. 1521)

Tinker concerned content based discrimination of political speech (students were not allowed to wear black armbands to protest the war).  Or was this “viewpoint” discrimination (would pro-war students have been allowed to wear yellow ribbons to express their support of the war)?  See p. 1521 (policy adopted in anticipation of antiwar armband expression).

Court holds (p. 1521-1522) that "it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate" and continued:
A student’s rights therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours.   
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during 
the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others.


 So, under Tinker, the personal speech of public school students (which includes, of course, their religious expression) is protected unless it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." (p. 1522) 

Moreover, school officials may not merely assert fear of disruption. In order to justify censorship as in Tinker, the school "must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id.

Now for some questions:

 Prof. Linder poses several good questions(link) for you to ponder:



--Do the speech rights of students increase as they get older? Do high school students have the right to speak in ways that elementary school students do not? Do university and graduate school students have the right to speak in ways that might be punished if they were students in a high school?
 
--Would Tinker have come out differently if school administrators could have demonstrated that the armband caused loud debates to break out in class? Fights to break out in the hall?
--In Tinker, the Court noted that the school banned armbands, but allowed other sorts of expression such as "Vote for Nixon" or "Vote for Humphrey" buttons. Would the school have had a stronger argument if it banned ALL forms of symbolic expression, campaign buttons, and clothing with messages? Would the school have prevailed in that case?
--Does a student in a predominately Jewish school have the right to wear a swastika to class to demonstrate his support for Nazi ideology? Does the First Amendment protect symbolic student speech only so long as it is not TOO controversial?

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