McCullen v. Coakley

"A Massachusetts statute makes it a crime to knowingly stand on a 'public way or sidewalk' within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place, other than a hospital, where abortions are performed."

Is this regulation content-based?

Is this like an ordinance banning residential picketing but which exempts "peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute?"

See Carey v. Brown: Striking down a state statute that generally bars picketing of residences or dwellings, but exempts from its prohibition "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute." Carey held that this ordinance "discriminates between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the demonstrator's communication." 447 U.S. at 460.

Or how about an ordinance, in the racially-segregated South in the 1950s, that creates a buffer zone in front of "any diner or restaurant that practices racial segregation?"

Or, during the Vietnam war era, a law that creates a buffer zone in front of "the corporate headquarters of a chemical company that manufactures napalm?"

Court says content-neutral, but what do you think?

Justice Alito says the ordinance constitutes viewpoint-discrimination:

 . . . [D]uring business hours, individuals who wish to counsel against abortion or to criticize the particular clinic may not do so within the buffer zone. If they engage in such conduct, they commit a crime. See § 120E½(d). By contrast, employees and agents of the clinic may enter the zone and engage in any conduct that falls within the scope of their employment. A clinic may direct or authorize an employee or agent, while within the zone, to express favorable views about abortion or the clinic, and if the employee exercises that authority, the employee’s conduct is perfectly lawful. In short, petitioners and other critics of a clinic are silenced, while the clinic may authorize its employees to express speech in support of the clinic and its work.
. . .
It is clear on the face of the Massachusetts law that it discriminates based on viewpoint. Speech in favor of the clinic and its work by employees and agents is permitted; speech criticizing the clinic and its work is a crime. This is blatant viewpoint discrimination.

 Do you agree with Alito?

The Court holds that the law is content-neutral. Nevertheless, it holds that the scope of the buffer zone is not narrowly tailored because it is so broad as to "burden substantially more speech than necessary to achieve" the state's significant interest in access to abortion services. (p. 1477).  See also p 1478: ("To meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government's interests, not simply that the chosen route is easier."); ("For a problem shown to arise only once a week in one city at one clinic, creating a 35-foot buffer zone at every clinic across the Commonwealth is hardly a narrowly tailored solution.")

So, the Court seems to reach the correct result for the wrong reason.