Frisby: Some Questions

First, the rules for Traditional Public Forum (p.1462):

“In these quintessential public for[a], the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. . . . The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”

 The Court says that "a public street does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply because it runs through a residential neighborhood." p. 1461

So TPF rules apply. This ordinance is content neutral because it bans all focused residential picketing.

But suppose it prohibited only "picketing focused at the home of a health care provider who performs abortions."

See Carey v. Brown *(p. 1461):

Striking down a state statute that generally bars picketing of residences or dwellings, but exempts from its prohibition "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute." Carey held that this ordinance "discriminates between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content of the demonstrator's communication." 447 U.S. at 460.

Or, during the Vietnam war era, "picketing focused at the home of an employee of a chemical company that manufactures napalm?"

Does the ordinance advance a "significant government interest?"

Is it narrowly tailored? What does that mean?

Does it leave open "ample alternative channels of communication?"