From Oyez:
Facts of the case
K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action."
Question
Did the discriminatory practices violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? [See casebook p. 1162: "While the principle is easily stated, the question of whether particular discriminatory conduct is private, on the one hand, or amounts to “state action,” on the other hand, frequently admits of no easy answer. . . ."]
Conclusion
No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court found that the Moose Lodge is "a private social club in a private building," and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.
How is this case different from Burton? See p. 1163: "In short, while Eagle was a public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private building."
Justice Douglas points to the "scarcity" of liquor licenses as a factor pointing toward state action. Thoughts? What about a private club that limits membership to persons holding certain ideological beliefs, say a club that limits membership to socialists or libertarians? If granted a liquor license, must they refrain from discriminating on the basis of ideological viewpoints under the theory of the dissent?
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