Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (p. 1165)

 From Oyez:

Facts of the case

Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

Question

Did Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's electrical service qualify as "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment?

 Conclusion

 No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court affirmed the Third Circuit and held that Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's service did not qualify as state action. Rehnquist reiterated that private actions are "immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, but this regulation did not make Metropolitan Edison part of the state.

Is "there a close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself?" Casebook p. 1165.

Is this case more like Burton or more like Moose Lodge?

Casebook p. 1167:

We  also  find  absent  in  the  instant  case  the  symbiotic  relationship  presented  in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). . . . Metropolitan is a privately owned corporation, and it does not lease its facilities from the State  of Pennsylvania. It alone is responsible for the provision of power to its customers. In common  with all corporations of the State it pays taxes to the State, and it is subject to a form of  extensive regulation by the  State in a way that most other business enterprises are not. But this  was likewise true of the appellant club in MooseLodge No. 107 v. Irvis...

 We  conclude  that  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  is  not  sufficiently  connected  with respondent’s  action  in  terminating  petitioner’s  service  so  as  to  make  respondent’s  conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. We  therefore have no occasion to decide whether petitioner’s claim to continued service was “property”  for purposes of that Amendment, or whether “due process of law” would require a State taking  similar action to accord petitioner the procedural rights for whichshe contends.

I think the Court is reluctant to be too quick to find that private action is state action, because as we have said a number of times, the Constitution "is not the law that governs us [private actors]. [It] is the law that governs those who govern us." Barnett quotation.