Holt v. Hobbs

 

                                        Abdul Maalik Muhammad (Petitioner Gregory Holt)

 

So Hobby Lobby won the case—it seems to me that this case is easy under RFRA—and no one really loses because Hobby Lobby’s employees will still get free contraceptive coverage under the less restrictive accommodation.

But now think about Holt v. Hobbs. 

 

Relevant texts of RLUIPA:

 

 

SEC. 3. <> PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS

                    EXERCISE OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS.

 

    (a) General Rule.--No government shall impose a substantial burden

on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an

institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of

Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997), even if the burden

results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government

demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person--

            (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

        and

            (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

        compelling governmental interest.

 

 

 

     (g) Broad Construction.--This Act shall be construed in favor of a

broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted

by the terms of this Act and the Constitution.

 

 

 

  (7) Religious exercise.--

                    (A) In general.--The term ``religious exercise''

                includes any exercise of religion, whether or not

                compelled by, or central to, a system of religious

                belief.

 

 

Hobby Lobby was a 5 to 4 decision. But Justice Alito’s opinion in Holt v. Hobbs is unanimous.

Holt v. Hobbs concerned RFRA’s sister law, RLUIPA (the Religious land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act), which provides that government may not substantially burden the religious exercise of an imprisoned person unless the government demonstrates that the burden “constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.”           

Justice Alito explicitly points out how RLUIPA was designed to expansively protect religious liberty (p. 2):

Several provisions of RLUIPA underscore its expansive protection for religious liberty. Congress defined “religious exercise” capaciously to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  Congress mandated that this concept “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.” And Congress stated that RLUIPA “may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.”

Basically, the facts were that the prisoner, Gregory Holt also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, is a devout Muslim who wished to grow a one-half inch beard based upon his sincerely held religious beliefs.

Arkansas prison regulations prohibited beards based upon concerns involving prison security.

Noting that the RLUIPA standard mirrors RFRA, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Holt was entitled to a religious exemption from the no beard prison grooming policy.

The Court held that Holt had “easily satisfied” his burden of establishing a substantial burden on his religious freedom, because the regulation required him to shave his beard or face serious disciplinary action.                      

Thus, the burden shifted to the Government to demonstrate that the grooming policy as applied to religious beards was the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest.

Justice Alito emphasized that the compelling interest test is a “rigorous standard,” that is difficult to meet. And that in any event, the requirement of least restrictive means is “exceptionally demanding.”

To make a long story short, the Court held that the prison’s interest in forbidding short beards was probably not compelling, and that, in any event, there were less restrictive means of ensuring that no razor blades or illegal drugs were hidden in one-half inch beards. For example, prison guards could require prisoners to run a comb through their beards to ensure that no weapons or drugs were concealed there.

Also, even if a clean-shaven photograph was necessary to protect security interests concerning easy identification of prisoners, a less-restrictive means would be to take the photograph when the prisoner was first admitted to the prison (p. 5). Or I would argue, take the picture with the beard and photoshop a clean-shaven prisoner.

Thus, the Court unanimously struck down the prison beard policy “insofar as it prevents [Holt] from growing a one-half inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.”

I suggest that the legal analysis in Hobby Lobby and Holt are identical, and that the difference in the two cases is simply that Hobby Lobby is a battle in the culture war over abortion and contraception, whereas Holt concerns a Muslim prisoner in a battle with prison officials.

All culture war cases, cases involving abortion or contraception or gay rights, are ideologically divisive and thus usually end up as 5 to 4 decisions even when the legal issues are easy.

Strategically, it is best to bring religious liberty cases involving politically-correct claims and plaintiffs. Imagine if Masterpiece Cakeshop had involved a gay cake artist who was ordered to bake a cake with a religious message condemning same-sex marriage as a serious sin?

Same case? Sure, but now the progressive Justices might find the gay baker’s First Amendment claims more sympathetically.