Loving v. Virginia: SDP and EPC

Notice that Virginia's racially discriminatory marriage law triggers strict scrutiny under two separate theories:

1. it is a classification that relates to a fundamental right under SDP (the right to marry);
2. it uses a suspect classification under the EPC (racial classifications are suspect).


Here is what the Court said about marriage as a fundamental right in Loving:

Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.

Suppose a state prohibits short people (i.e. those under 5 foot tall) from marrying. What standard of review would apply when Danny DeVito sues to challenge the constitutionality of this law?

What about laws which refuse to recognize incestuous marriages between adults (e.g., an adult son and his mother who wish to marry) or plural marriages among consenting adults? Does strict scrutiny apply to these denials of "marriage equality?"

Do we need a definition of "marriage" to apply the rule that the "right to marry" is a fundamental right?

If so, how did the Court define marriage in Loving? If fundamental rights are those deeply and objectively rooted in American history and tradition, what definition of marriage is "deeply rooted in American history and tradition?"