Monday, October 09, 2006

Lochner and the Liberty of Consenting Adults


Notice that Lochner views Substantive Due Process as protecting the liberty of consenting adults to enter into any contract that pleases them, so long as no third party is harmed by their conduct. The decision protects the right of adults to choose--to make economic choices and to enter into economic relationships with other consenting adults.

Should laws that restrict the right of consenting adults to agree to wages, hours, rents, and other terms and conditions of their economic lives be held to violate the "liberty" protected by the Constitution? Does government have the right to impose a particular view of social justice and public morality on consenting adults who wish to enter into "unfair" or "immoral" or "unhealthy" agreements?

If you think the right of consenting adults to agree to labor on terms of their choosing is not a protected constitutional liberty, what about the liberty of consenting adults to engage in various types of sexual conduct and relationships? Should the state be allowed to regulate consensual sexual conduct under the police power--the power to pass laws to advance public health, safety, morals or the general welfare?

In other words, if you believe that the Constitution protects the "liberty of the citizen to do as he likes [in the bedroom] so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same," (Holmes opinion at p. 520), then shouldn't adult citizens also have the right to do as they please in their economic lives? If your answer is no, why is paternalism and public morality a legitimate basis for legislation in the conference room, but not in the bedroom?

Why should we think SubstantiveDue Process protects the sexual autonomy and right of choice of adults, but not the economic autonomy and right of choice of adults? Is it because the one liberty is "fundamental" and the other is not? How do you know this? Which language or principle in the written Constitution supports your analysis?

Monday, October 02, 2006

"Moderate" Justices and Ideological Decisionmaking


Are so-called "moderate" Justices, such as O'Connor and Kennedy, less (or more) likely to engage in ideological judging? Over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Ilya Somin says perhaps more:

Indeed, in two important ways moderate jurists may be more prone to ideological judging than more extreme ones. First, moderate judges such as Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, are more likely to favor complex balancing tests than strong liberals and conservatives, who are more likely to favor bright line rules. Balancing tests tend to leave more scope for judicial discretion (and thus ideological decisionmaking) than rules do.

Second, I suspect that moderates are less likely than comparative extremists to realize that their political preferences are the products of a contestable ideology rather than of simple, nonideological "common sense." Indeed, Garrow's own article partially endorses this fallacy, to the extent that he assumes that moderate views are, by nature, less "ideological" than extreme ones. Of course, if you believe that your views are just common-sense truths that only extremist wingnuts/moonbats could disagree with, you are less likely to be hesitant about imposing them on others through the use of judicial power.


Hmmm. What do y'all think?

Tuesday, September 19, 2006

Does the Court Follow the Times?


Todd Zywicki has a great post over at the Volokh Conspiracy. Here is a major excerpt:

New York Times Hypothesis:

Awhile back, around the time of Lawrence and Grutter in particular, the hypothesis was floated--mainly in jest, I assume--that the best predictor of Surpreme Court outcomes in many socially and politically controversial cases was the conventional wisdom of America's political and legal elite. And that this consensus could be captured in an operative variable as being the expressed position of the New York Times Editorial Board (perhaps the Washington Post Editorial Board as well).

The Court's ruling in Kelo got me thinking about this hypothesis again, and so I went back and looked at the New York Times Editorials in three recent cases that came to mind as perhaps the most obvious tests of the hypothesis--Kelo, Raich, and Granholm. Sure enough, traditional legal variables seem to do fairly poorly in predicting the results in those cases, as many have noted. The composition of the majorities and minorities are all over the place with little consistency.
But one variable does hit the mark three out of three times--in each case, the Supreme Court ruling met with the approval of the New York Times Editorial Page. Moreover, Kennedy--who has typically been characterized by critics as being the most susceptible to being swayed by elite opinion--voted with the Times, I mean the majority, in each of the three cases (by my calculation, he was the only one who did so).

In addition to Lawrence and Grutter, of course, the New York Times variable also accurately predicted the outcome in the Campaign Finance Reform case. I haven't double-checked whether Kennedy voted with the majority in each of those three as well.

To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever taken the "New York Times Hypothesis" seriously enough to test it empirically, but at first glance at least, it looks like it has some pretty good predictive power. If someone has run regressions on this, obviously I would be interested in the results.



Justices just want love--from people in power. So they do what it takes to earn that love.

Friday, September 08, 2006

Public Expression of Religion Act


From the Religion Clause blog:

By voice vote yesterday, the House Judiciary Committee approved H.R. 2679, the Public Expression of Religion Act. The bill, which now goes to the full House of Representatives, would limit relief in Establishment Clause claims to issuance of an injunction, and would deny the award of attorneys' fees and expenses to plaintiffs who win Establishment Clause lawsuits. Americans United For Separation of Church and State strongly criticized the Committee's action. AU Executive Director Rev. Barry W. Lynn said: "This bill is nothing more than an attempt to scare people away from having their day in court. The House Judiciary Committee should be ashamed of itself for passing such a blatantly un-American scheme."

Notice this is a way to check the Court's EC jurisprudence without limiting its jurisdiction. The provision denying attorney's fees in EC cases is huge!

Tuesday, August 29, 2006

House votes to protect Pledge

Link

Excerpt:

The House yesterday voted to protect the "under God" phrase of the Pledge of Allegiance from judges who might declare it unconstitutional, the measure being another element of the Republican-pushed values agenda in the lead-up to the fall elections.

Supporters said the Pledge Protection Act, which passed on a 260-167 vote, was necessary because of court decisions such as a 2002 ruling in California from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The court ruled it an unconstitutional "endorsement of religion" to require public-school students to recite the Pledge in its current form. In 1954, Congress added the words "under God" to demonstrate opposition to atheistic communism.

The Pledge Protection Act was backed by 221 Republicans and 39 Democrats, with eight Republicans, 158 Democrats and the chamber's only independent opposed.

"Judges should not be able to rewrite the Pledge," said Majority Whip Roy Blunt, Missouri Republican.

The measure denies federal courts the jurisdiction to rule on interpretation of the Pledge and forbids the Supreme Court from ruling on Pledge appeals. State courts would be free to decide the matter as a state issue.

"We must step in," said Rep. Todd Akin, the Missouri Republican who sponsored the bill. He called it Congress' responsibility to "stand up to the court when they are misusing the Constitution."

Alito Article

From How Appealing (link):

"Alito: The life and times of a justice in the making." Because The Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger is a newspaper whose articles do not remain online for long, I'm going to break with my usual vacation-week practice to note that today's edition of that newspaper contains an article headlined "Alito: The life and times of a justice in the making."

The article explains, "With the court in summer recess, Sam Alito and his wife, Martha-Ann, agreed earlier this month to their first interviews since he was confirmed. They talked about the Senate hearings, about her tearful breakdown during a now famous session. He also spoke about the inner workings of one of the most closely watched courts in the nation's history."

Friday, August 25, 2006

President Refusing to Enforce Laws He Deems Unconstitutional

Suppose the Supreme Court decides a case, as it did in Plessy v. Ferguson, that reverses Brown v. Board and holds that racially segregated public institutions are not unconstitutional. Now suppose further that Congress passes a law (over the President's veto) that requires public buildings and public facilities to be segregated by race.

The President issues a statement declaring that he disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and declares that he will not enforce the segregation law because he believes it is unconstitutional.

Is it proper for the President to follow his interpretation (as opposed to the Court's interpretation) of the Constitution when carrying out his power to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and his oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Thursday, August 24, 2006

The Great Debate


Here are a couple of questions I submit to you all for comment.

1. There seems to be a consensus that judicial restraint is good and judicial activism is bad. But not everyone agrees what these terms mean. What do you think? What is judicial activism and why is it bad? When should courts exercise restraint?

2. Justice Brennan reads the Constitution as protecting liberty by means of "majestic generalities" such as the "ideal of human dignity." Assuming human dignity is a constitutional ideal, is it one capable of application? How does a Court know what human dignity means in the context of constitutional litigation? Is this any different from reading the Constitution as a general directive to judges to decide all important public policy issues based upon their own subjective preferences (their own view of what "human dignity" means)? Is this consistent with the Constitution's explicit recognition of the most important freedom of all, the freedom of a people to participate in democratic self-government through law?

Wednesday, August 09, 2006

UT Link

link

Now imagine that UNL had an official website that gave some advice about "Spirituality and Fears About the After Life" that included some advice:

James Smith, who was raised in a liberal Unitarian church, suffered from his fear that a truly Holy God could not possibly ignore the reality of sin.

" I was raised in a church that teaches that salvation is universal and is earned, regardless of what you believe, by living a good life. But I know that I am not good, at least not in the eyes of a holy and righteous God. I realized that trusting Jesus and the blood He shed for me on the cross was the only way for me to get past my guilt and my sins. The God I really believed in was a God who was both Holy and Merciful. His holiness demanded that He hate my sin, but in His mercy and His love he sent his Son to die for those who trust in Him."

This is an experience many people go through. Faced with a conflict between their religion and their concept of what God must really be like, they come to realize that a truly righteous God can not grade on the curve and that a truly merciful God would create one path--the way of the Cross--to save those who accept His mercy."

Would this statement of spiritual counseling from UNL officials violate the EC?

Sunday, August 06, 2006

Link Fixed: Christian Legal Society v. Walker

I fixed the link in the syllabus for this case. Here it is as well. This time I mean it!!!

Friday, August 04, 2006

Poway Hypos

Was the problem for the court in Poway that the banned t-shirt used the word "shameful?" Suppose instead pro-family students wore t-shirts on National Day of Truth proclaiming:

"THE TRUTH SHALL NOT BE SILENCED"

"ONE MAN ONE WOMAN ONE FAMILY"

Would a t-shirt such as this have passed muster under the 9th Circuit's reading of Tinker?

Suppose in, say, Kansas a public school student is disciplined for wearing a t-shirt on the National Day of Silence proclaiming:

"HOMOPHOBIA IS SHAMEFUL"

Could this shirt be banned under Poway due to disruptions that occurred at last year's Day of Silence? Would it matter if the school banned the anti-homophobia t-shirts while permitting students to wear pro-family t-shirts such as the one in the first hypo above?

Let's talk about these issues in today's class!

Thursday, August 03, 2006

The Right Not to Read a Book With Whores In It

What I would like you all to do is post a comment sharing your views about Hentoff's great chapter on the "right not to read" a book contrary to one's conscience.

Please. Everyone. Speak up! Fill cyberspace with your intelligence!

Nat Hentoff is an old style ACLUer, one who believes that free speech and freedom of thought are at the very core of liberty. He is a friend (well, a friendly acquaintance) of mine and I always enjoy reading his columns. He brings the eye of a journalist--an eye for facts and human details--to his analysis of legal issues.

Wednesday, August 02, 2006

Mt. Soledad Cross Litigation

Link

Excerpt:

"Seventeen years of legal wrangling later, the 29-foot monument still crowns a hill over the Pacific – defended by city ballot measures, federal legislation and even one congressman's appeal for presidential intervention.

Now the Supreme Court has weighed in, and the case of the Mount Soledad cross may set a precedent on whether the government can let religious symbols be maintained in public places.

State and federal judges have ordered the cross removed, saying it represents an unconstitutional endorsement of one religion. Earlier this month, the Supreme Court halted an order that the city take it down by Aug. 1, giving state and federal courts time to hear appeals this fall."


UPDATE (from How Appealing blog):

"Senate approves transfer of cross; Passage unanimous; Bush expected to sign": The San Diego Union-Tribune today contains an article that begins, "The U.S. Senate approved a plan yesterday to transfer land beneath the Mount Soledad cross to the federal government, bolstering supporters who have been fending off efforts to remove the monument for nearly two decades."
And The Los Angeles Times reports today that "U.S. Senate Votes to Acquire Site of Cross."

Saturday, July 29, 2006

Can a Christian Club be Christian?

From the How Appealing blog:

"Kent school Bible club dispute becomes a federal case;

Court fight centers on 'Christians only' membership limit": Yesterday's edition of The Seattle Post-Intelligencer contained an article that begins, "It seemed a simple idea: two high school girls who wanted to start a Bible club at Kentridge High School. But the once-quiet grumbling over their Christians-only membership plan has now erupted into a full-scale federal case. On Thursday, a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, meeting in Seattle, sat rapt as lawyers argued on the one hand for religious freedom and, on the other, against allowing discrimination in a public school district."
The
Ninth Circuit has posted online the oral argument audio at this link (Windows Media format).Posted at 02:35 PM by Howard Bashman

If our schedule permits, we may listen to this oral argument in class--RFD

Thursday, July 27, 2006

RFRA Case Decided

From How Appealing:

Today's U.S. Supreme Court Order List and opinions in argued cases:


1. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, No. 04-1084, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court affirming the Tenth Circuit's ruling that the federal government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring respondent's sacramental use of the hallucinogenic tea known as hoasca. You can access the syllabus here; Chief Justice Roberts's opinion here; and the oral argument transcript here.

Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Maine Discriminatory Voucher Case

From the Religion Clause blog:

Cert. Filed In Maine School Voucher Case

A petition for certiorari has been filed in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Maine Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Town of Durham, according to today's New York Sun. The decision upheld a state school voucher program for students from small towns with no high schools. Towns may pay for those students to attend a non-sectarian public or a private school, but they may not pay for attendance at religious parochial schools. (See prior posting.)



And here is more from How Appealing:

The Institute for Justice yesterday issued a press release entitled "Parents Ask U.S. Supreme Court To End Religious Discrimination & Vindicate Full School Choice." A copy of the petition for certiorari filed yesterday can be viewed at this link, while the Main Supreme Judicial Court's ruling is available here.Posted at 08:58 AM by Howard Bashman

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

Guns (and Knives) Save Lives

This is not a Religion & the Constitution post.

From the Volokh Conspiracy (link):

Three Cheers for Mr. Cope:

The
AP reports:

Two victims of a knife-wielding grocery store employee remained hospitalized Saturday after the man attacked eight co-workers and was finally stopped by a witness who pulled a gun, authorities said....

Elartrice Ingram, 21, was charged with nine counts of attempted first-degree murder, police said....

Ingram, chasing one victim into the store's parking lot, was subdued by Chris Cope, manager of a financial services office in the same small shopping center, Memphis Police Sgt. Vince Higgins said.

Cope said he grabbed a 9mm semiautomatic pistol from his pickup truck when he saw the attacker chasing the victim "like something in a serial killer movie."

"When he turned around and saw my pistol, he threw the knife away, put his hands up and got on the ground," Cope told The Associated Press. "He saw my gun and that was pretty much it." ...

While I'm at it, and since a tangential search came up with it, I might as well add this:

With Australian outback hero Crocodile Dundee as her inspiration, an 80-year-old British pensioner foiled a knife-wielding burglar with an even bigger blade of her own.

When woken by a masked man holding a knife, Winifred Whelan screamed and ran downstairs to the kitchen.

Grabbing a giant carving knife, she told the startled intruder "You call that a knife? This is a knife" in an echo of the famous scene in the Crocodile Dundee film when actor Paul Hogan confronted a New York mugger.

As she took on the intruder, her husband grappled with his accomplice.

Good work.