Smith "hybrid" Claims

The Smith Court recognized one class of free exercise cases that continue to be reviewed under the compelling interest test – so-called “hybrid” cases in which the free exercise clause is linked to another constitutional claim such as free speech or parental choice.  P. 1866. Why did the Court need to recognize hybrid cases" See p. 1865 ("We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."--Is this true?

 

The Court specifically cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Yoder as cases which survive Smith’s revisionism.  Thus, when a free exercise interest “reinforces” a claim based upon parental rights, free speech, or association, the governmental restrictions still must be tested under the compelling interest standard.

If you are already protected by another constitutional right, of what value is it to “reinforce” your claim with the free exercise clause?

            Is this a case of 1 + 0 = 1?  If so, why bother with the zero?

Or, can you argue that so long as you can reinforce your free exercise claim with another constitutional interest (whether or not it would be suffi­cient standing alone to strike down the restriction), you get full strict scrutiny protection? 

Is this like combining two losing lottery tickets to get one "hybrid" winning ticket?

Why isn’t the Smith case itself a “hybrid” case?  Doesn’t it involve both free exercise and associational rights (group participation in a religious sacrament)?