Content Neutrality

In Carey v. Brown (see casebook p. 1331), an ordinance prohibited residential picketing but exempted "the peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute." Is this ordinance content neutral?

How about the Westminster ordinance which prohibits focused picketing outside "religious premises" at the time of "a scheduled religious activity." Is that content neutral?

Here is how the Court describes its rule([See Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U. S. 37 (1983) quoted in part at p. 1332 of casebook):

“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. (P. 209) Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. . . .”

See also Krishna case infra.