Roger Clegg: A Brief Dialogue on Judicial Activism
Central to the judicial nominations debate is the question of judicial activism. Through a series of questions and answers written for the Committee for Justice, Roger Clegg explains what types of decisions constitute judicial activism and why Americans from across the political spectrum should oppose it. Clegg is president of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a former high-ranking Justice Department official, and one of the nation's leading experts on civil rights law.
A BRIEF DIALOGUE ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
By Roger Clegg
Q. What is judicial activism?
A. Judicial activism is when a judge ignores what the text of the Constitution or some other law says and substitutes instead his own preference for what it ought to say. It can involve putting something into the text that isn't there, or taking out something that is there.
Q. Is it activism whenever a court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional?
A. Of course not. If a statute violates the Constitution, it would be judicial activism not to strike it down. Striking down a statute is judicial activism only if the statute really isn't inconsistent with the Constitution.
Q. Is it activism whenever a court overrules one of its own precedents?
A. Again, of course not. The principle of stare decisis - Latin for "Let the decision stand" - is a venerable one, and there are good reasons for courts not lightly to ignore their past rulings. But from time to time they do so, and it really doesn't make sense to call it judicial activism when they do. After all, how can overruling a decision that was itself activist be properly labeled activist?
Q. But don't liberals complain that the current Supreme Court is activist because it has struck down some federal statutes, and mightn't they complain that overruling a decision like Roe v. Wade is activist?
A. They have and they might, but in their heart they know this is a bogus claim.
Q. Okay, so judicial activism is just a court ignoring the text of a law and substituting its own policy preferences. But why is this a left-versus-right argument?
A. It shouldn't be. And, indeed, sometimes judicial activism has led to results that liberals would presumably dislike. Exhibit A is, of course, the infamous Dred Scott decision, where Chief Justice Taney made up a constitutional prohibition against Congress limiting the spread of slavery. At the present time, judicial activism is being used by the left in the culture wars, but it has not always been so, nor will it always be so.
Q. So, probably there are instances where conservatives would like for judges to bend the Constitution's text one way, and liberals would like to bend the text the other way. But why shouldn't this be part of what judges do? Put bluntly: What's wrong with judicial activism?
A. What you're asking is, "What's wrong with judges ignoring the Constitution?" and the answer is the same as the answer to "What's wrong with the President (or Congress) ignoring the Constitution?" Sure, in the short term the Constitution may thwart policies or outcomes that this group or that group might prefer. But in the long run the Constitution protects us all, and it is perilous to urge any of the three branches of government to ignore it.
Here is a response to Barnett's proposal.The Case for a Federalism Amendment
How the Tea Partiers can make Washington pay attention.
By RANDY E. BARNETT
In response to an unprecedented expansion of federal power, citizens have held hundreds of "tea party" rallies around the country, and various states are considering "sovereignty resolutions" invoking the Constitution's Ninth and Tenth Amendments. For example, Michigan's proposal urges "the federal government to halt its practice of imposing mandates upon the states for purposes not enumerated by the Constitution of the United States."
While well-intentioned, such symbolic resolutions are not likely to have the slightest impact on the federal courts, which long ago adopted a virtually unlimited construction of Congressional power. But state legislatures have a real power under the Constitution by which to resist the growth of federal power: They can petition Congress for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.
Article V provides that, "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states," Congress "shall call a convention for proposing amendments." Before becoming law, any amendments produced by such a convention would then need to be ratified by three-quarters of the states.
An amendments convention is feared because its scope cannot be limited in advance. The convention convened by Congress to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation produced instead the entirely different Constitution under which we now live. Yet it is precisely the fear of a runaway convention that states can exploit to bring Congress to heel.
Here's how: State legislatures can petition Congress for a convention to propose a specific amendment. Congress can then avert a convention by proposing this amendment to the states, before the number of petitions reaches two-thirds. It was the looming threat of state petitions calling for a convention to provide for the direct election of U.S. senators that induced a reluctant Congress to propose the 17th Amendment, which did just that.
What sort of language would restore a healthy balance between federal and state power while protecting the liberties of the people?
One simple proposal would be to repeal the 16th Amendment enacted in 1913 that authorized a federal income tax. This single change would strike at the heart of unlimited federal power and end the costly and intrusive tax code. Congress could then replace the income tax with a "uniform" national sales or "excise" tax (as stated in Article I, section 8) that would be paid by everyone residing in the country as they consumed, and would automatically render savings and capital appreciation free of tax. There is precedent for repealing an amendment. In 1933, the 21st Amendment repealed the 18th Amendment that had empowered Congress to prohibit the sale of alcohol.
Alternatively, to restore balance between federal and state power and better protect individual liberty, the repeal of the income tax amendment could be folded into a new "Federalism Amendment" like this:
Section 1: Congress shall have power to regulate or prohibit any activity between one state and another, or with foreign nations, provided that no regulation or prohibition shall infringe any enumerated or unenumerated right, privilege or immunity recognized by this Constitution.
Section 2: Nothing in this article, or the eighth section of article I, shall be construed to authorize Congress to regulate or prohibit any activity that takes place wholly within a single state, regardless of its effects outside the state or whether it employs instrumentalities therefrom; but Congress may define and punish offenses constituting acts of war or violent insurrection against the United States.
Section 3: The power of Congress to appropriate any funds shall be limited to carrying into execution the powers enumerated by this Constitution and vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; or to satisfy any current obligation of the United States to any person living at the time of the ratification of this article.
Section 4: The 16th article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed, effective five years from the date of the ratification of this article.
Section 5: The judicial power of the United States to enforce this article includes but is not limited to the power to nullify any prohibition or unreasonable regulation of a rightful exercise of liberty. The words of this article, and any other provision of this Constitution, shall be interpreted according to their public meaning at the time of their enactment.
Except for its expansion of Congressional power in Section 1, this proposed amendment is entirely consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. It merely clarifies the boundary between federal and state powers, and reaffirms the power of courts to police this boundary and protect individual liberty.
Section 1 of the Federalism Amendment expands the power of Congress to include any interstate activity not contained in the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. Interstate pollution, for example, is not "commerce . . . among the several states," but is exactly the type of interstate problem that the Framers sought to specify in their list of delegated powers. This section also makes explicit that any restriction of an enumerated or unenumerated liberty of the people must be justified.
Section 2 then allows state policy experimentation by prohibiting Congress from regulating any activity that takes place wholly within a state. States, of course, retain their police power to regulate or prohibit such activity subject to the constraints imposed on them, for example, by Article I or the 14th Amendment. And a state is free to enter into compacts with other states to coordinate regulation and enforcement, subject to approval by Congress as required by Article I.
Section 3 adopts James Madison's reading of the taxing and borrowing powers of Article I to limit federal spending to that which is incident to an enumerated power. It explicitly allows Congress to honor its outstanding financial commitments to living persons, such its promise to make Social Security payments. Section 4 eliminates the federal income tax, after five years, in favor of a national sales or excise tax.
Finally, Section 5 authorizes judges to keep Congress within its limits by examining laws restricting the rightful exercise of liberty to ensure that they are a necessary and proper means to implement an enumerated power. This section also requires that the Constitution be interpreted according to its original meaning at the time of its enactment. But by expanding the powers of Congress to include regulating all interstate activity, the Amendment greatly relieves the political pressure on courts to adopt a strained reading of Congress's enumerated powers.
Could such a Federalism Amendment actually be adopted? Stranger things have happened -- including the adoption of each of the existing amendments. States have nothing to lose and everything to gain by making this Federalism Amendment the focus of their resistance to the shrinking of their reserved powers and infringements upon the rights retained by the people. And this Federalism Amendment would provide tea-party enthusiasts and other concerned Americans with a concrete and practical proposal by which we can restore our lost Constitution.
Mr. Barnett is a professor of constitutional law at Georgetown University and the author of "Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty" (Princeton, 2005).
Access online today's rulings in argued cases and Order List of the U.S. Supreme Court: The Court has announced rulings [in two important Bill of Rights cases]:1. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. announced the judgment of the Court in McDonald v. Chicago, No. 08-1521. You can access the ruling at this link and the oral argument transcript at this link.
2. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, No. 08-1371. You can access the ruling at this link and the oral argument transcript at this link.
"In Clarence Thomas's gun rights opinion, race plays a major role": In today's edition of The Washington Post, metro columnist Courtland Milloy has an essay that begins, "He hardly ever speaks during oral arguments, often appearing asleep on the bench. But in his written opinion Monday supporting the right to bear arms, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas roared to life."
 |
| IS THIS WHY POLITICAL ELITES FEAR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION? |
Recent DevelopmentsAnd here is a great post from ReligionVlause on the case:
Oral Argument April 19, 2010: Find the transcript archived here. Christian Legal Society filed its Reply Brief on April 2, 2010. Appendices to the brief are also available: Appendix A and Appendix B. On February 4, 2010, numerous Amici Curiae filed briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court in support of CLS. These briefs are available here. The Brief for Petitoner was filed in the U.S. Supreme Court on January 28, 2010. Click here to download the brief. On December 7, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court granted CLS's petition for certiorari. Click here for Press Release and quotes.
Summary of Case
The Christian Legal Society (CLS) chapter at the University of California - Hastings College of the Law filed a lawsuit on October 22, 2004, against school officials who denied recognition to the group because the chapter requires its officers and voting members to adhere to the CLS Statement of Faith. This was not the first time a state university had discriminated against CLS (for other examples of this discrimination, click here).
The CLS chapter asked school officials in early September 2004 to exempt the group and other religious student organizations from the religion and sexual orientation portions of the university's nondiscrimination policy. As applied to CLS, this nondiscrimination policy would force the chapter to allow persons who hold beliefs and engage in conduct contrary to the CLS Statement of Faith, which includes a prohibition on extramarital sex, to join as voting members and to run for officer positions. School officials denied this request and stripped the chapter of recognition and the benefits of recognition, including student activity fee funding.
In its lawsuit CLS alleges that UC Hastings' exclusion of its chapter violates, among other constitutional rights, CLS' right of expressive association and CLS' right to be free from viewpoint discrimination.
CLS argues that is a violation of the right of expressive association to force a religious student organization to accept officers and voting members who hold beliefs and engage in conduct in opposition to the group's shared viewpoints, thereby inhibiting the group's ability to define and express its message.
CLS also argues that it is a violation of the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination to impose the above requirement on a religious student organization while permitting every other recognized student organization on campus to limit its officers and voting membership to persons who agree with the group's shared viewpoints.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of defendants, including school officials and Hastings Outlaw, a recognized student organization, on April 2006. CLS appealed this ruling. A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in this case on March 10, 2009. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Proctor Hug, Jr., and Judge Carlos T. Bea. The panel affirmed the district court's opinion, ruling against CLS in an unpublished disposition on March 17, 2009.
On May 5, 2009, CLS filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision against CLS.
The Christian Legal Society's Center for Law & Religious Freedom and the Alliance Defense Fund represent the CLS chapter, and attorneys Timothy Smith and Stephen Burlingham are serving as local counsel.
Advocacy Groups React To CLS v. Martinez
Many advocacy groups and interested parties have issued statements on yesterday's Supreme Court decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. Here is a sampling:
Citizens Link suggests that the decision may have limited impact because few if any other schools have an "all-comers" rule for student groups. Most have a rule that bars discrimination on specified grounds, such as race, religion, gender and sexual orientation. The majority avoided passing on the constitutionality of this sort of rule. The Chronicle of Higher Education also reviews reactions to the decision.
- ACLU
- Alliance Defense Fund
- American Center for Law & Justice
- American Jewish Committee
- Americans United for Separation of Church and State
- Baptist Joint Committee
- Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
- Christian Legal Society
- Foundation for Individual Rights in Education
- Hastings College of Law
- Interfaith Alliance
- Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
The Toledo Blade reports that on Monday a federal lawsuit was filed against the University of Toledo by its former Associate Vice-President for Human Resources, Crystal Dixon. Dixon was fired after she wrote a column for a local newspaper arguing that gays and lesbians are not "civil rights victims." (See prior posting.) The complaint (full text) alleges that "Plaintiff, an African-American woman and sincere practicing Christian, believes that homosexuality is a grave offense against the Law of God and that comparing homosexual activity with the struggles of African-American civil rights victims is absurd and untenable because she believes homosexuality is a lifestyle choice and not an immutable or inherent genetic and biological characteristic...."
The lawsuit alleges that Dixon's column expressed her personal views, and that her firing infringes her 1st Amendment free speech rights. The complaint also claims equal protection violations, arguing that others University personnel have been permitted to speak out on political and social issues without consequences. Richard Thompson of the Thomas More Law Center who represents Dixon said that homosexuals have an "inordinate amount of influence" over University president Lloyd Jacobs. The University claims that Dixon's human resources position was one of special sensitivity, and that her ability to perform that job was undermined by her statements.
In Washington state on Wednesday, two pharmacists and the owner of a supermarket that contains a pharmacy, sued to challenge the state's new rule that requires pharmacies to fill orders for emergency contraceptives. (See prior posting.) The so-called Plan B morning-after pill is now available over-the-counter to adults. Individual pharmacists with religious or moral objections can refuse to supply a customer with the contraceptives only if they can find a co-worker at the same pharmacy to fill the order. The lawsuit filed in federal court in Seattle claims that the new rules violate pharmacists' constitutional rights by requiring them to choose between "their livelihoods and their deeply held religious and moral beliefs." The Associated Press reports on the case. [Thanks to Melissa Rogers for the lead.]
UPDATE:Here is a copy of the complaint and the motion for a preliminary injunction. The case is Storman's v. Selecky. More on the case is at Constitutionally Correct and in this release from the Alliance Defense Fund which is representing the plaintiffs.
Much ado about a little cross
Salazar v. Buono, 08-472, Opinion recapAnalysis
A spectator in the Supreme Court chamber Wednesday morning could well have understood that the Justices had just made a major new pronouncement on the constitutionality of placing religious monuments on government property. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, announcing his opinion and the Court’s ruling in Salazar, et al., v. Buono, spoke with obvious approval of erecting such monuments as tributes to those who died in military combat, and of the overall civic virtue in having religious symbols displayed on government grounds.
Kennedy was paraphrasing an opinion that said “The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm….The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.” The problem, though, is that those expressions had only three votes, and thus did not speak for the Court. A tangled case, which had been through four separate stages in court and had led to a new law passed by Congress, ended in a tangled set of six opinions from the Supreme Court, not one representing a majority. The ruling, though, can be sorted out, and, in the end, it does not reach any final outcome.
First, the votes can be counted up:
** There are seven votes for the notion that a retired National Park Service employee had a legal right to take to court his complaint about a small Christian cross standing in a remote spot in a massive piece of federal property, the Mojave National Preserve in California. Two Justices dissented explicitly on that point. Another citizen troubled about such displays, however, could not read the Court’s conclusion on the right to sue in this case as necessarily clearing the way for a challenge in another case with a different history.
** There are five votes for the conclusion that a federal judge was wrong in barring a congressionally-ordered transfer of the plot of ground on which the cross stands to private ownership, although that result came from two different kinds of reasoning: three Justices said it was wrong as a legal proposition, while two said the Park Service employee should never have been allowed to pursue his complaint. Four other Justices would have upheld the judge’s order (for two different reasons).
** Despite the conclusion that the federal judge was wrong on that point, the Court voted 4-4 to send the case back to that judge to take another look, more closely, at Congress’ action. The four votes in favor of sending the case back were supported by two different rationales. Four other Justices opposed the remand, but that, too, resulted from two different approaches. With the Court split evenly on that issue, though, the case definitely will go back because that is the formal “judgment” of the Court, which had five votes behind it (based on three different rationales).
** There were three votes for the notion that the Court should not even have decided this case: two Justices said so because of their view that the cross’s challenger had no right to be in court, and one said so because there was “no federal question of general significance in this case.” Those views did not prevail.
Perhaps the most decisive thing the Court had to say was this comment in the lead opinion, by Justice Kennedy: “To date, this Court’s jurisprudence in this area has refrained from making sweeping pronouncements, and this case is ill suited for announcing categorical rules.”
Second, some impressions come from reading between the lines. Based on what was actually said, and from the known positions of some Justices on the issue of religious monuments on government property, this conclusion can be advanced tentatively: the little cross standing atop Sunrise Rock in the Mojave is likely to win out in the end, if the Veterans of Foreign Wars wants to remove the present plywood cover that obscures it from view, and put up a sign claiming the cross to be a tribute to war dead, rather than to the Christian faith. And Congress might well draw the conclusion that, at some point, five of the present Justices may well allow the lawmakers to keep a religious monument on government property by transferring the plot of ground on which it stands to private ownership. The latter, if it does occur at some point, would be a new constitutional declaration, perhaps coming close to being a “categorical rule.”
Justice Kennedy’s favorable comments about religious displays “in the public realm” were supported by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. (who expressed even more favorable comments in his separate opinion). To those three probably could be added, in what Justice Antonin Scalia said would have to be “a proper case” in the future, the votes of Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas, because in prior disputes they have supported such displays.
On the other side, three Justices — Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, plus the soon-to-retire John Paul Stevens — made it clear on Wednesday that they remain quite firmly opposed to such displays. And Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who has been on both sides of the issue in the past, this time voted to uphold the court order against the display in the Mojave even while saying that the Court should not have taken on the dispute in the first place.
The Court obviously labored over the ruling; it was the earliest argued case this Term still awaiting a decision, and the crafting of six opinions no doubt took up the time since it was heard on the third day of the Term.
And here are some more links from How Appealing:
Access online today's ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in an argued case: The Court today issued its ruling in Salazar v. Buono, No. 08-472, the case involving the Mojave cross.You can access the Court's ruling at this link and the oral argument transcript at this link.
The flap over Christine O’Donnell’s debate comment suggests that many people still don’t know how Separation of Church and State became part of the law of the First Amendment.
On this, I reprint part of an old post from 2005:
6. The phrase “Separation of Church and State,” as Philip Hamburger establishes in his classic book on the subject, is not in the language of the first amendment, was not favored by any influential framer at the time of the first amendment, and was not its purpose.
7. The first mainstream figures to favor separation after the first amendment was adopted were Jefferson supporters in the 1800 election, who were trying to silence Northern clergy critical of the immoral Jeffersonian slaveholders in the South.
8. After the Civil War, liberal Republicans proposed a constitutional amendment to add separation of church and state to the US Constitution by amendment, since it was not already there. After that effort failed, influential people began arguing that it was (magically) in the first amendment.
9. In the last part of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, nativists (including the KKK) popularized separation as an American constitutional principle, eventually leading to a near consensus supporting some form of separation.
10. Separation was a crucial part of the KKK’s jurisprudential agenda. It was included in the Klansman’s Creed (or was it the Klansman’s Kreed?). Before he joined the Court, Justice Black was head of new members for the largest Klan cell in the South. New members of the KKK had to pledge their allegiance to the “eternal separation of Church and State.” In 1947, Black was the author of Everson, the first Supreme Court case to hold that the first amendment’s establishment clause requires separation of church & state. The suit in Everson was brought by an organization that at various times had ties to the KKK.
11. Until this term, the justices were moving away from the separation metaphor, often failing to mention it except in the titles of cited law review articles, but in the last term of the Court they fell back to using it again.
12. As Judge Roberts pithily pointed out in the hearings, only one justice (Breyer) thought that both of the leading establishment clause cases delivered this last term were correctly decided.
Editorial
The Court and Free Speech
When the Supreme Court ruled 8-to-1 this week that a federal law banning the sale of animal-cruelty videos violates the First Amendment, it reaffirmed the right to engage in even highly unpopular speech. And it wisely declined to create another category of expression outside of the First Amendment’s protection.
With this case and the court’s earlier Citizens United decision on corporate speech and political campaign contributions, this could be one of the most important terms in years for defining the constitutional scope of freedom of expression — for better or for worse.
Taken together, the rulings give freedom of speech a wide berth in two directions. The animal-cruelty ruling takes a strong and welcome stand that there should be only very narrow exceptions to the general rule that almost all content of speech is protected. That view is broadly accepted by most judges and constitutional scholars, and was reflected in the fact that eight justices from across the political spectrum joined the majority.
The campaign finance ruling, regrettably, gave a particular kind of speaker — corporations — a more expansive free speech right to spend than the court has ever acknowledged. The break there with the nation’s legal traditions was sharp, and opened the floodgates for big business and special-interest dollars to overwhelm American politics. That was delivered by a bitterly divided 5-to-4 court.
The animal-cruelty case involved Robert Stevens, who ran a business that sold disturbing, even disgusting, videos of pit bulls fighting and attacking other animals. Mr. Stevens was convicted under a federal law that criminalizes the sale of depictions of animal cruelty if the acts are illegal in the state where the depiction is sold.
The Supreme Court ruled, in United States v. Stevens, that Mr. Stevens’s conviction violated the First Amendment. It declined to add animal cruelty to the short list of forms of expression — including obscenity, incitement and defamation — that are not protected by the Constitution.
It then went on to rule that the federal law was overly broad, since it swept within its coverage many sorts of images that should be considered core protected speech. For example, hunting is illegal in the District of Columbia, and under the law, selling hunting magazines there would also be illegal.
The majority opinion, by Chief Justice John Roberts Jr., was a strong affirmation of the importance of freedom of expression, even in the face of substantial societal condemnation of the horrific nature of some of the speech involved. It was gratifying that the court recognized that the right way to protect animals from abuse is through laws aimed at the abuse itself, not at free expression.
The court has two more important free speech cases coming up. One raises the question of whether people have a right to keep their identities secret if they signed a petition to put a referendum against same-sex marriage on the ballot. Putting an initiative on the ballot is an important governmental act, and we hope the court does not decide that there is a right to do so anonymously.
The court has already heard arguments in a challenge to a federal law barring material support to terrorists, which prohibits some kinds of speech in support of controversial causes. We hope it narrows the statute’s scope, carefully sorting through what kinds of assistance are protected speech, and what are the sorts of aid the government can properly prohibit.
That respectful treatment of the First Amendment, also reflected in the Stevens case, is what the nation needs from this court — not the recklessness of the ruling in the Citizens United case.
