Court Decides Two Free Speech Cases

From How Appealing blog:

"Freedom of Speech Is Buttressed as U.S. Supreme Court Caps Nine-Month Term": Greg Stohr of Bloomberg News has this report. And in today's edition of The Wall Street Journal, Jess Bravin reports that "Court Conservatives Prevail; Videogame, Campaign-Finance Rulings Cap Term That Broadened Free Speech."

Today's Endorsement Controversy

From ReligionClause blog:

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Atheists Complain Over Renaming of Brooklyn Street As "Seven In Heaven"

Monday's Brooklyn Paper reports that American Atheists has complained over the renaming of a portion of a Brooklyn, New York street to honor seven firefighters who were among those killed at the Twin Towers on 9-11.  The new street sign in honor of the men reads "Seven In Heaven Way." American Atheist spokesman David Silverman said: "It’s improper for the city to endorse the view that heaven exists. It links Christianity and heroism." Community Board 6 member Tom Miskel responded: "Almost every religion has some form of heaven. It’s not just specific to Christianity."

Why Would NBC Even Think To Do This?

BETHESDA, Md. -- NBC issued an on-air apology Sunday for omitting the words "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance during its coverage of golf's U.S. Open.

The words were edited out of a clip of children reciting the oath -- a move immediately noted by viewers, who took to Twitter and various blogs to voice their anger, the Huffington Post reported.

In a statement during the broadcast, NBC commentator Dan Hicks said, "We began our coverage of this final round just about three hours ago and when we did it was our intent to begin the coverage of this U.S. Open Championship with a feature that captured the patriotism of our national championship being held in our nation's capital for the third time.

"Regrettably, a portion of the Pledge of Allegiance that was in that feature was edited out. It was not done to upset anyone and we'd like to apologize to those of you who were offended by it."

Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/19/nbc-apologizes-for-omitting-under-god-from-pledge-during-us-open-broadcast/#ixzz1PuqT3lY0

Both Fridays (the 24 and the 1st)?

Someone suggested in the comments that we take both Fridays off (both the 24th and the 1st) and make up the 100 minutes by starting a little early and ending a little late.

I have already gone over about 20 minutes (I love talking about the First Amendment and sometimes its hard to stop--sorry)!

So, I figure if we start 10 minutes early (i.e. at 11:20) and end 10 minutes late (i.e. 1:20) Monday through Thursday next week we will have out 80 minutes made up.

It is up to you all. I can go either way.

Let me know what you all think tomorrow first thing.

Rick Duncan

No Class Friday June 17

As I announced in class, one of our two scedulaed class cancellations will be this Friday, June 17.

I have not decided on the second Friday off. Should it be June 24? Or July 1?

Help me out.

For Thursday June 9

Read assignment three plus read the Allegheny County case linked as part of Assignment 4.

Cheers, Rick Duncan

For Our First Class--Please Comment on This Hypo

Assume that a local public high school puts up a large "gay pride--stop homophobia" poster on the wall in the front hallway in order to celebrate Gay Pride Month.

A few conservative religious students and their parents, offended by this poster and its ideological message, complain to the school district's superintendent, who orders the school's principal to take down the display.

How should the Constitution handle a case like this?

Should students and parents offended by the poster have a right to demand it be removed from the public schools? Suppose they claim that it makes them feel like outsiders in the school, because the school's poster amounts to a public endorsement of the idea that the dissenters' religious views about human sexuality and marriage are wrong and perhaps even immoral?

Or should the law tell the dissenters "if you don't like the poster, then avert your eye and don't look at it."

Should GLBT students and allies who want to be able to view this poster have a free speech right, as a willing audience for the poster, to demand that the poster not be removed under fire to appease dissenters who are offended by the poster?

Or should the federal courts stay out of this matter and allow the political process to decide which posters may be displayed and which may be removed at the behest of those who are offended?

Who are the heroes of this hypothetical and who are the villains? Explain your conclusions.

Please feel free to write your answers as comments right here on the blog.

Anonymous comments are fine; just be civil and respectful of others.

New Free Speech Case

From Yahoo news:

Jilted ex-boyfriend puts up abortion billboard

 

 

ALAMOGORDO, N.M. – A New Mexico man's decision to lash out with a billboard ad saying his ex-girlfriend had an abortion against his wishes has touched off a legal debate over free speech and privacy rights.
The sign on Alamogordo's main thoroughfare shows 35-year-old Greg Fultz holding the outline of an infant. The text reads, "This Would Have Been A Picture Of My 2-Month Old Baby If The Mother Had Decided To Not KILL Our Child!"

Fultz's ex-girlfriend has taken him to court for harassment and violation of privacy. A domestic court official has recommended the billboard be removed.

But Fultz's attorney argues the order violates his client's free speech rights.

"As distasteful and offensive as the sign may be to some, for over 200 years in this country the First Amendment protects distasteful and offensive speech," Todd Holmes said.

The woman's friends say she had a miscarriage, not an abortion, according to a report in the Albuquerque Journal.

Holmes disputes that, saying his case is based on the accuracy of his client's statement.

"My argument is: What Fultz said is the truth," Holmes said.

The woman's lawyer said she had not discussed the pregnancy with her client. But for Ellen Jessen, whether her client had a miscarriage or an abortion is not the point. The central issue is her client's privacy and the fact that the billboard has caused severe emotional distress, Jessen said.

"Her private life is not a matter of public interest," she told the Alamogordo Daily News.

Jessen says her client's ex-boyfriend has crossed the line.

"Nobody is stopping him from talking about father's rights. ... but a person can't invade someone's private life."

For his part, Holmes invoked the U.S. Supreme Court decision from earlier this year concerning the Westboro Baptist Church, which is known for its anti-gay protests at military funerals and other high-profile events. He believes the high court's decision to allow the protests, as hurtful as they are, is grounds for his client to put up the abortion billboard.

"Very unpopular offensive speech," he told the Alamogordo Daily News. "The Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, said that is protected speech."

Holmes says he is going to fight the order to remove the billboard through a District Court appeal.

San Francisco's Ban on Circumcision and Religious Liberty

I don't know if we will have time to cover this in class, but here is a post from the ReligionClause blog on a cutting edge issue:

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Constitutionality of San Francisco's Proposed Circumcision Ban Debated

A number of posts around the blogosphere in recent days debate the constitutionality of San Francisco's upcoming ballot issue (see prior posting) that would ban male circumcision on individuals under 18 years of age except in cases of clear medical necessity, with no exception for religiously mandated circumcision. The posts look at three related issues: free exercise issues (under state and federal law), parental rights issues, and the so-called "hybrid rights" doctrine (free exercise claims reinforced by a parental rights claim). Here are links to some of the more thoughtful analyses:

• Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban (with No Discussion of Religious Freedom In This Post) [discussing parental rights issues].
• Eugene Volokh, Proposed San Francisco Circumcision Ban, and Religious Freedom
• Slate's Jeremy Singer-Vine, Snip: A San Francisco ballot measure would ban circumcision. Is that legal? [discussing free exercise issues]
• Michael Helfand, Why San Francisco Ballot Measure Proposing Circumcision Ban Is Unconstitutional [discussing hybrid rights theory]
• Mirror of Justice, Circumcision and Hybrid Rights

Cyber-Bullying Laws and First Amendment

From Volokh blog:

 

First Amendment and Proposed Restrictions on Bullying (and Cyber-Bullying) of K-12 Students

Eugene Volokh • May 17, 2011 4:04 pm

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a briefing last Friday on bullying (and cyber-bullying) of K-12 students; there were many people speaking about various aspects of this question, and in particular about whether and to what extent the federal government should get involved. I spoke about the First Amendment issues created by broad “anti-bullying” or “anti-harassment” policies, whether imposed by the federal government or by state or local governments.
If you’re interested in this subject, you might check out the videos of the various panels here (see the main item, and the first three related items). My own brief presentation starts at about 20:23, with follow-up questions and answers at 57:35, 1:01:00, and 1:13:58. You can also look at the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights Dear Colleague letter to which I refer, and see my written testimony.

Snyder v. Phelps--"Lesson Plan"

The Harlan Institute has a great "lesson plan" on the Phelps "funeral picketing" case. Here.

EC Standing Decision

From ReligionClause blog:

Friday, April 15, 2011

7th Circuit: No Standing To Challenge National Day of Prayer

In Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Obama, (7th Cir., April 14, 2011), the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that Freedom from Religion Foundation and its members lack standing to challenge either the constitutionality of the federal statute that creates a National Day of Prayer or the Presidential proclamations issued under that statute. While all three judges concluded that plaintiffs lack standing, the opinion by Judge Easterbrook (joined by Judge Manion) swept more broadly in doing so that did the concurring opinion by Judge Williams.

As to the statute-- 36 USC Sec. 119-- which directs the President to issue a Proclamation each year declaring the first Thursday in May as a national day of prayer, Judge Easterbrook concluded that since it merely imposes a duty on the President, only the President is injured enough by the statute to have standing. Others cannot "object to a statute that imposes duties on strangers."  The President's proclamation, on the other hand, are addressed to plaintiffs, like all other citizens. However since the Proclamations merely make a request that citizens are free to deny, no one is injured by them. Judge Easterbrook continued:

Plaintiffs contend that they are injured because they feel excluded, or made unwelcome, when the President asks them to engage in a religious observance that is contrary to their own principles.... [However] offense at the behavior of the government, and a desire to have public officials comply with (plaintiffs’ view of) the Constitution, differs from a legal injury. The “psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees” is not an “injury” for the purpose of standing.

Judge Williams, concurring, found this case to be closer, and the Supreme Court precedent to be less clear, that Judge Easterbrook asserted.  Williams wrote:

The [Supreme] Court simply has not been clear as to what distinguishes the psychological injury produced by conduct with which one disagrees from an injury that suffices to give rise to an injury-in-fact in Establishment Clause cases.... [The Supreme] Court has decided cases in many contexts where the plaintiffs claimed that they were hurt by exposure to unwelcome religious messages from the government.... In all of those cases, the Court treated standing as sufficient, even though it appears that nothing was affected but the religious or irreligious sentiments of the plaintiffs..... 

In the case, the district court had found that plaintiffs had standing, and later concluded that the federal statute violates the Establishment Clause. (See prior posting.) AP reports on the decision. FFRF immediately issued a press release announcing that it will seek en banc review.

Taxpayer Standing Under EC--This Term's Blockbuster

From the Con Law Prof blog:

No Standing in Establishment Clause Challenge: Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn Opinion Analysis

The Court issued its 5-4 opinion in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, reversing the Ninth Circuit's finding that the Arizona statute violated the Establishment Clause by holding that the challengers lacked standing.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia identifies the "struggle" between the majority and dissent as being whether the challenge to the Arizona tuition tax credit falls within the narrow exception of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).  For Scalia (joined by Thomas), this struggle is unnecessary because the "misguided" decision of Flast v. Cohen should be repudiated.
The Arizona provision at issue in Winn allows a tax credit for a contribution to school tuition organizations, STOs, many of which are religious.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy quickly sets the tone by noting that the challengers "sought intervention from the Federal Judiciary."  In further description of the facts, Kennedy notes that while the challengers "may be right that Arizona’s STO tax credits have an estimated annual value of over $50 million," the Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization is also right that "the STO program might relieve the burden placed on Arizona’s public schools," and the "result could be an immediate and permanent cost savings for the State."
Kennedy thereafter analyzes the requirement of particularized injury:

Even assuming the STO tax credit has an adverse effect on Arizona’s annual budget, problems would remain. To conclude there is a particular injury in fact would require speculation that Arizona lawmakers react to revenue shortfalls by increasing respondents’ tax liability.[citation omitted].  A finding of causationwould depend on the additional determination that any tax increase would be traceable to the STO tax credits, as distinct from other governmental expenditures or other tax benefits. Respondents have not established that an injunction against application of the STO tax credit would prompt Arizona legislators to “pass along the supposed increased revenue in the form of tax reductions.”

Thus, the injury must be economic, give that the "STO tax credit is not tantamount to a religious tax or to a tithe and does not visit the injury identified in Flast."
Kagan, writing for the four dissenting Justices, argues that there is little, if any, difference between appropriations and tax expenditures:  "Cash grants and targeted tax breaks are means of accomplishing the same government objective," and taxpayers who "oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to protest whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other."
Kagan criticizes the Court's opinion as offering a "road map —more truly, just a one-step instruction—to any government that wishes to insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge":

Structure the funding as a tax expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way. No taxpayer will have standing to object. However blatantly the government may violate the Establishment Clause, taxpayers cannot gain access to the federal courts. And by ravaging Flast in this way, today’s decision damages one of this Nation’s defining constitutional commitments. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”—

Kennedy's Opinion for the Court ends by appealing to the prospect of a different type of damage and constitutional commitment: limited judicial power.

Few exercises of the judicial power are more likely to undermine public confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the Judiciary than one which casts the Court in the role of a Council of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the behest of anyone who disagreeswith them. In an era of frequent litigation, class actions, sweeping injunctions with prospective effect, and continuing jurisdiction to enforce judicial remedies, courts mustbe more careful to insist on the formal rules of standing,not less so. Making the Article III standing inquiry all the more necessary are the significant implications of constitutional litigation, which can result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’ power to change. The present suit serves as an illustration of these principles. The fact that respondents are state taxpayers does not give them standing to challenge the subsidies that [Arizona statute] §43–1089 allegedly provides to religious STOs. To alter the rules of standing or weaken their requisite elements would be inconsistent with the case-or-controversy limitation on federal jurisdiction imposed by Article III.

 RR

This Term's Major Religious Liberty Case

The WSJ has an interesting preview by Prof. David Skeel (here).

And here is the text of the piece:

While much of the nation was digesting the implications of the election Wednesday morning, the Supreme Court heard arguments in a long simmering dispute over the constitutionality of tax credits for religious and other private schools. For those who read Supreme Court tea leaves, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn is the church-state case to watch.
In 1997, Arizona passed a statute permitting residents to contribute up to $500 ($1,000 for married couples) that they would otherwise pay in taxes to a nonprofit "school tuition organization" of their choice. STOs are charitable groups that give scholarships to students in private schools.
Because many STOs provide their scholarships to religious schools, a group of citizens sued, challenging the program as an unconstitutional establishment of religion and asking the courts to kill it. Last year the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and struck it down.
I expect the Supreme Court to reverse that decision; but the grounds on which it chooses to reverse may be just as important as the outcome of the case itself.
In the 2002 case Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, a divided court (5-4) upheld a Cleveland school voucher program, reasoning that parents, not the state, decided how to use the vouchers. So even though 96% of parents used their vouchers for Catholic private schools, the state didn't violate the separation of church and state by issuing the vouchers in the first place.
In Arizona, similarly, it is citizens—not the state—who decide whether to use their tax credit for a religious STO or a nonreligious one. The pending Supreme Court case, therefore, seems to fit comfortably within the Zelman precedent.
Still, the outcome is no sure thing. Justice Anthony Kennedy is often the court's swing vote, especially in church-state decisions, and he is never predictable. And the most revealing vote might be cast by Justice Elena Kagan, the court's newest member.
Justice Kagan was appointed to the court after the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens, who had served since 1975. On matters of church and state, Justice Stevens generally adopted a stance of strict separation. He tartly demurred from the court's endorsement of vouchers in Zelman, dismissing the decision as "profoundly misguided."
It was "quite irrelevant," he argued, that parents rather than the government were the ones deciding whether to use their vouchers for a religious or non-religious school. Anything that might "remove a brick from the wall that was designed to separate religion and government," he said, must be prohibited.
Though Justice Stevens was arguably the staunchest advocate of separation, his view in Zelman reflected that of the court's liberal wing, which now includes Justice Kagan (and Justice Sonia Sotomayor).
Yet the Arizona case is the kind of issue on which Justice Kagan, who is likely to be reliably liberal on many issues, could part ways with her liberal colleagues. As dean of Harvard Law School, Ms. Kagan was widely praised for fostering political and religious diversity, creating a welcoming attitude toward conservative and evangelical professors and students. Whatever her vote in the Arizona case, her background suggests she'll be less averse than her predecessor to accommodating religion in public life.
The other reason to watch this case closely is that the outcome may turn on "standing." To challenge a government program, a plaintiff must show that he or she has been injured by it. Accordingly, several justices asked on Wednesday whether the Arizona program puts any of the plaintiffs' money at stake. Arizona argues that it doesn't, as the program merely gives residents tax credits (as opposed to taxpayer-funded vouchers). If the court agrees, then the plaintiffs may not have standing to sue.
The Supreme Court has long interpreted "injury" leniently in church-state cases, treating them as exceptions to the rules of standing. Were it to conclude that the Arizona taxpayers don't have standing to sue, the court would reverse past practice—and could greatly reduce the number of possible future challenges to state programs that implicate religion in some way.
That would leave more of the decisions about programs that benefit religious schools to state and local lawmakers—and fewer of them to unelected judges.

Mr. Skeel is a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania and co-author of the blog "Less Than the Least."

Classifications based upon Alienage

We don't have time to discuss this in class (and there is a course that deals specifically with immigration issues), but here is the basic outline:

State Laws

"State and local laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage are...generally deemed to involve a suspect classification and are thus subject to strict scrutiny." Ides and May Book.

However, state laws that discriminate against illegal aliens are generally subject to rational basis review. Id. However, "the Court has been willing to apply a standard of review that is more searching than rational basis review to at least some state laws that discriminate against undocumented alien children." Id.

Federal laws

Because of the constitutional responsibility of Congress to regulate alienage, "federal laws that discriminate against aliens" are generally "reviewed under a rational basis standard." Id.

Q & A Session--Friday, 12-2-10, at 11:50 AM

Tomorrow, immediately following class, we will have a Q & A Session to help you get ready for the final exam.

Final Exam

Here is some information about the final exam.

It is a 3 hour, closed book (Closed Mode) examination.

You are required to take it on your computers (or on one of the law college's lab computers).

You must have the current semester version of Exam 4 already loaded on your computer. If you have any questions about this, please see Vicki in the Dean's Office well before the scheduled date of the exam.

The Exam has two parts--an essay part and a multiple choice/true-false part. The essay questions are in the short to medium range (i.e. from 200 to 500 words in length). Please make sure to observe the word limitations for each question.

You will need a supply of number 2 pencils to mark your answer sheets on the objective part of the exam.

Have a great Thanksgiving break! Family, friends, food and football!

Cheers, Rick Duncan

Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence

Here is an interesting link.

FYI: Supreme Court Oral Arguments in Arizona Tuition Scholarship Tax Credit Case

This is a Con Law II issue, but a very interesting and important one. From the ReligionClause blog:

Supreme Court Hears Arguments In Arizona Tuition Scholarship Tax Credit Case

The U.S. Supreme Court today heard oral arguments (full transcript) in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn along with Garriott v. Winn. At issue is the constitutionality of Arizona's program that gives tax credits for contributions to school tuition organizations that in turn provide scholarships primarily to children attending parochial schools. Scotus Blog has links to all the briefs filed both by the parties and by amici.  In the case, the 9th Circuit held that plaintiffs have taxpayer standing to challenge the state programs and that the programs violate the Establishment Clause. (See prior posting.) Lyle Denniston has a recap of the arguments posted at Scotus Blog. He described it as "a passionate hour spent heavily on the difference between a tax credit and a tax deduction, intertwined with a focus on the arcane subject of "taxpayer standing" to file a lawsuit...."  ABC News also reports on the arguments.

Iowa Supremes Rejected by Voters

From today's Des Moines Register:

Three Iowa Supreme Court justices lost their seats Tuesday in a historic upset fueled by their 2009 decision that allowed same-sex couples to marry.

Vote totals from 96 percent of Iowa's 1,774 precincts showed Chief Justice Marsha Ternus and Justices David Baker and Michael Streit with less than the simple majority needed to stay on the bench.

Their removal marked the first time an Iowa Supreme Court justice has not been retained since 1962, when the merit selection and retention system for judges was adopted.

The decision is expected to echo to courts throughout the country, as conservative activists had hoped.

"It appears we're headed for a resounding victory tonight and a historic moment in the state of Iowa," said Bob Vander Plaats, the Sioux City businessman who led a campaign to remove the justices because of the 2009 gay marriage ruling. "The people of Iowa stood up in record numbers and sent a message ... that it is 'We the people,' not 'We the courts.' "
In a statement issued early today, the three justices said: "We hope Iowans will continue to support Iowa's merit selection system for appointing judges. This system helps ensure that judges base their decisions on the law and the Constitution and nothing else. Ultimately, however, the preservation of our state's fair and impartial courts will require more than the integrity and fortitude of individual judges, it will require the steadfast support of the people."
Not everyone agreed with Vander Plaats or the majority of voters.

"In the end, the aggressive campaign to misuse the judicial retention vote, funded by out-of-state special interests, has succeeded," Drake University Law School Dean Allan Vestal said. "The loss of these three justices is most unfortunate, and the damage to our judicial system and the merit selection of judges will take much to repair."

Ternus, Streit and Baker will remain on the bench until Dec. 31.
Justices serve staggered, eight-year terms. David Wiggins is up for retention in 2012; Mark Cady, Daryl Hecht and Brent Appel face voters in 2016.

The ouster effort grew out of the April 2009 gay marriage ruling that stunned the nation, outraged social conservatives and turned Iowa into the first Midwestern state to sanction same-sex marriage.

Iowa's seven justices declared that a law barring same-sex marriage violated the constitution's equal-protection rights of gay and lesbian couples who wish to marry.
Groups that wanted the justices ousted poured more than $650,000 into their effort, with heavy support from out-of-state conservative and religious groups. Campaigns that supported the justices and the current state court system spent more than $200,000.

Two Polk County judges who faced retention challenges survived with more than 60 percent of the vote, as did all of their colleagues at Iowa's largest courthouse.

Judge Robert Hanson, who sided with six same-sex couples in the Polk County District Court ruling, was retained with 66 percent support once all precincts were counted. Polk County District Judge Scott Rosenberg, targeted in a last-minute automated phone campaign for signing one gay couple's marriage waiver, kept his seat on the bench with 69 percent.
Hanson said he was elated and grateful for the support of Polk County voters but was disturbed by the loss of the three justices.

"I'm very, very thankful for the support, and for (voters') apparent appreciation of the proper functions of the judiciary," Hanson said.

Ternus, 59, the most senior justice on the seven-member court, was appointed to the bench by then-Gov. Terry Branstad in 1993. She became Iowa's first female justice in 2006.

Baker, 57, the newest justice, was appointed by Gov. Chet Culver in 2008.
Streit, 60, joined the court in 2001. He was appointed to the district court bench by Branstad in 1983.

Iowans interviewed at polling stations based their votes heavily on the gay marriage ruling.

Chris Keller, 31, of Waukee voted "yes" to retain the three justices because he disagreed with political attacks based solely on the gay marriage opinion.

"It's not the justices' responsibility to let the people vote," Keller said. "It's the lawmakers' responsibility, and they chose not to do that. Legally, the court's ruling was the right decision."
Bernie Noel of Bloomfield said he had never voted "no" on a justice until Tuesday. The 43-year-old said he opted to retain his local district court judges, who "do a great job, and are good people." But the gay marriage ruling swayed him against the justices.

"I don't think they should have the power to change the constitution and take things into their own hands," Noel said. "It's a hard job to do, but here, in this case, I just really think they overstepped their bounds."
The retention challenge triggered a battle never seen in Iowa's judicial history. Television, radio and Internet ads portrayed the justices as both activists and referees. Robo-calls urged a "no" vote. U.S. Rep. Steve King embarked on a statewide bus tour to rally "no" voters.

Supporters of the justices included former governors Robert Ray, a Republican, and Democrat Tom Vilsack, and other prominent figures in government.

Supporters of the justices considered the attacks an affront to the integrity of Iowa's courts and how justices are selected

What is the lesson of this amazing political outcome? Is it that the voters are wrong to politicize the judiciary? Or that the Court was wrong to politicize the state constitution?